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ABSTRACT 
 
Addressing Endogeneity of Casino, Crime and Regional Economy: A Case of Las Vegas, 
Nevada 
 
by 
 
Wei Bao, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2013 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Man-Keun Kim 
Department: Applied Economics 
 
This paper presents an approach to investigate the statistical relationship among 
casino activities, crime rates and number of visitors in Las Vegas, NV.  Numerous studies 
have attempted to answer the question whether casino gaming increases crime rates. Casino 
gaming is statistically correlated with more crimes when researchers use the reported crime 
rate, i.e., ratio of the number of crimes to local population.  However, there is no statistical 
relationship between the two when researchers use the visitor adjusted crime rate 
(henceforth adjusted crime rate), i.e., ratio of the number of crimes to local population and 
visitors, in their analyses. Somewhat surprisingly, previous studies have failed to consider the 
endogeneity issue, i.e., coincidental impacts of casino activities and crimes.  This paper 
addresses endogeneity among variables by estimating the impact of casino activities on 
crimes and also impact of crimes on casino activities. To deal with endogeneity, a system of 
three equations representing casino activities, the number of visitors, and visitor adjusted 
crime rates is estimated using three stage least squares.  
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Elasticity of the casino revenue with respect to the adjusted crime rate is estimated to 
be 0.220.1 and elasticity of the adjusted crime rate with respect to casino revenue to be 
0.290.27.  In addition, using the regression of the personal income on the casino revenue in 
Las Vegas, the impact of the adjusted crime rate on the regional economy is estimated.  
Results show that one percent increase in crime leads to cumulative decreases in the personal 
income by $105$44 per household per year. 
Policy implications based on findings in this research are i) efforts to reduce crime 
can be effective tool to boost the regional economy (in Las Vegas), ii) cutting the link 
between casino gambling and crime is important; to cut the link, pay more attention on 
education or regulation to reduce pathological gamblers, usurious loans and the fraud related 
to casino gambling, and iii) improving the image of casino gambling that are related to 
crimes and thus attracting more visitors. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 As of 2011, there are almost 500 commercial casinos operating in 22 states in the 
U.S., with revenues of over $35.6 billion (Table 1) (American Gaming Association (AGA), 
2012). These commercial casinos have created about 340,000 job opportunities and paid 
almost $12.9 billion in wages (AGA, 2012). According to Bazelon, Neels and Seth (2012), 
the commercial casino industry supported $125 billion in spending and nearly 820,000 jobs 
in the U.S. economy (in 2010) including direct, indirect and induced impacts.1  As shown in 
Figure 1 and Table 1, the casino revenue indeed increased quickly during the past two 
decades except 2007~2009 due to financial crisis. Walker (2010) points out that there is a 
“new wave of commercial casino legalization”. The casino revenue of Nevada and Las Vegas, 
Nevada has the similar patterns in Figure 1.   
The achievements of the gambling industry in Las Vegas stimulate the desire of 
policymakers and politicians in other states and regions, especially the regions without much 
competitiveness, to legalize casino gambling. 
 
                                                 
1 Economic impacts are based on consumer (visitors) expenditures (direct effect). These expenditures affect the 
local and regional economy through the inter-industry relationships among different sectors and industries of 
the local economy. Casino visitors’ expenditures on, say, gas, food and lodging, cause business-to-business 
(upstream, or indirect effects) exchanges as retailers make purchases from wholesale suppliers.  Downstream 
effects (i.e., induced effects) occur as those employed by retailers and wholesalers use their wages to buy 
homes, cars, food, entertainment, etc. 
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Figure 1: Casino Revenues, 1992-2011 
Source: American Gaming Association (2001 and 2012); Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming 
Control Board (1992-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the growth rates of casino revenues for the U.S., Nevada, and 
Las Vegas, Nevada.  For years, the growth rates of casino revenues are higher than that of 
the US GDP.  The US casino revenue growth rates range from 5% to 20% before 2008. The 
average growth rate between 1993 and 2011 is 7.4%.  As shown in Figure 2 the growth rates 
of casino revenue for the U.S. is higher than those of Nevada and Las Vegas. It is not only 
because there are more states that legalized commercial casinos over time, but also because 
more people consider the casino activities to be acceptable (See Figure 3).  
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Table 1: Operating Casino Numbers and Gaming Revenue 
State Year 
Legalized 
Operating Casino Numbers Gaming Revenue ($ millions)a 
 2001 2006 2011 2001 2006 2011 
Nevada 1931 247 274 256 9,500 12,622 10,701 
New Jersey 1976 12 11 11 4,300 5,219 3,318 
Iowa 1989 13 19 18 923 1,573 1,424 
South Dakota 1989 40 36 35 59 90 101 
Colorado 1990 43 46 40 632 782 750 
Illinois 1990 9 9 10 1,800 1,924 1,477 
Mississippi 1990 30 27 30 2,700 2,570 2,239 
Louisiana 1991 16 19 18 535 2,942 2,374 
Rhode Island 1992 
 
2 2  407 513 
Indiana 1993 10 11 13 1,800 2,577 2,721 
Missouri 1993 11 11 12  1,592 1,805 
Delaware 1994 
 
3 3 1,000 652 552 
West Virginia 1994 
 
4 5  976 959 
Michigan 1996 3 3 3  1,303 1,424 
New Mexico 1997 
 
5 5  238 249 
New York 2001  8 9  424 1,259 
Maine 2004  1 1  38 59 
Oklahoma 2004  3 2  74 32,106 
Pennsylvania 2004  2 10  10 3,024 
Florida 2006  2 5   382 
Kansas 2007   2   48 
Maryland 2008   2   156 
Total  434 496 492 24,348 36,043 35,641 
a Current dollar 
Source: American Gaming Association 2002, 2007, and 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Figure 2: The Growth Rates of Casino Revenues and US GDP, 1993-2011 
Source: American Gaming Association (2001 and 2012); Nevada Gaming Commission and 
State Gaming Control Board (1992-2011), and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 There are more than 59.7 million people (about 25% of the US adult population) 
who gambled in casinos during 2011 (AGA, 2012). Higher demand for the legal casino 
services from the consumers, and the massive revenue gained from casinos and casino-
related service industries have made local governments eager to legalize the casino industry. 
Though the casino industry has become more prosperous, local community leaders 
and residents take this issue more prudently. In August 2012, the Governor of Illinois, Pat 
Quinn, vetoed an expansion plan of Chicago casinos that would have added five new casinos 
to the state (Chicago Tribune, 2012). In his veto message, Quinn said “the state must not 
allow ethical shortcomings that allow loopholes for mobsters.” (Chicago Tribune, 2012) The 
action of Governor Quinn represents that there are issues and concerns arising when a local 
government contemplates to introduce or expand commercial casinos in a region.  
5 
 
 
Figure 3: U.S. Casino Gaming Acceptability, 2003-2012 
Source: Modified from American Gaming Association (2012, p.35) 
  
 
 Figure 3 shows that, in 2012, 46% of survey respondents take casino gambling as 
acceptable for anyone including themselves, and 35% take that as acceptable for anyone but 
not for themselves. In total, roughly 80% of survey respondents answered that casino 
gambling is acceptable.  
 However, 16% of respondents do not accept casino gaming (Figure 3). We observe 
in Figure 3 that the public are somewhat contradictory.  We may interpret the survey results 
this way; more than 50% (Accept for Others not You 35% + Not Acceptable for Anyone 
16%) of respondents do not like casino gambling for themselves.  Plausible explanation is 
that people want to enjoy casino gambling, casino-related services and entertainments, but 
also are concerned negative effects that casino gambling may bring to the local community.  
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 According to AGA (2012), potential negative impacts that casinos may bring to the 
communities are crime, prostitution and negative image of communities, “…hurt the image 
of communities where they are located” (AGA 2012, p. 27)2.  In addition, there exist issues 
and concerns regarding casino business on the local economy which are tax revenues, 
employment and other non-gambling industries. Among them, the linkage between casino 
activities and crimes has attracted researchers’ and policy makers’ attention for decades.   
1.2. Research Objectives 
1.2.1. Endogeneity between Casino Gambling and Crime 
 As mentioned above, an important concern regarding casino gambling is the 
connection between casino gambling and crime in the local community. It leads us to a 
natural question, whether the introduction or the expansion of casino gambling increases the 
crime incidences in the region. Thus, the first research question of the study is to investigate 
the relationship between casino gambling and crime.   
Many studies (summarized in Table 2 in Chapter 2) have attempted to answer this 
question. Some early studies (studies published during 1985~2000) suggest that casino 
gambling causes a higher crime rate, for example, Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt (1989), 
Hakim and Buck (1989), and Giacopassi and Stitt (1993). This is consistent with our 
intuition. If there is an increase in population and visitors in an area stimulated by the casino 
activities, there is likely to be more crime incidents. However, some of the other early studies 
                                                 
2 Almost nine out of 10 community leaders, e.g., senators, mayors, city and county council members, fire or 
police chiefs, district attorneys and so on, disagree, saying this is not the case (AGA 2012, p. 27) 
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cannot find a clear linkage between casino gambling and crimes, e.g., Albanese (1985), 
Curran and Scarpitti (1991), Chang (1996), and Stokowski (1996).  
Recent studies (studies published during 2001~2010) have relied on more complete 
data, larger markets, and advanced econometric analysis, however, the findings are mixed.  
Gazel, Rickmand and Thompson (2001), Evans and Topoleski (2002), and Grinols and 
Mustard (2006) claim that casinos increase crime rate.  However, Wilson (2001), Barthe and 
Stitt (2007, 2009a, 2009b), Clark and Walker (2009), and Reece (2010) do not find the clear 
linkage between casinos and crimes. 
Somewhat surprisingly, all of the studies listed in Table 2 ignore the endogeneity 
issue.  Endogeneity, simultaneous determination, occurs between casino activities and crimes 
because there is a bi-directional causality between them as discussed in the following sections. 
Endogeneity of casinos and crime may lead us the inconclusive results due to the 
simultaneous bias.  Endogeneity between casino activities and crime is investigated in order 
to address our first research goal.   
1.2.2. Casino Gambling, Crime and Regional Economy 
 The connection between casino gambling and crime leads us to a related question, 
i.e., whether more crime incidents or a higher crime rate has negative impacts on casino 
gambling and, in turn, the regional economy. Generally, a region that adopted casinos has 
experienced increases in household income and employment (Garrett, 2004).  However it 
seems likely that, a higher crime has a negative impact on the regional economy due to the 
fact that visitors would avoid regions where the crime rate is high.  It can be critical in the 
region of which economy depends on the casino industry such as Las Vegas, Nevada. In this 
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study, the relationship between casino gambling and the regional economy is also 
investigated.    
1.3. Organization of the Research 
 To achieve these research objectives, this study will build a simultaneous-equations 
system to estimate the effect of casinos on crime and vice versa, and measure the impact of 
casino and crime on the regional economy.  This study is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 
explores the previous literature about casino gambling, crime and the regional economy, and 
discusses why we should consider endogeneity among variables.  Chapter 3 outlines the 
structural model and methodology used in the study. Chapter 4 explains the data we use, 
some key variables in the model, and discusses the estimation results.  Chapter 5 concludes 
the study, with a focus on policy implications.    
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. Relationship between Casino Gambling and Crime 
 People are concerned that casino gambling may bring more crimes to the local 
community. Unfortunately studies that have investigated the relationship between casino 
gambling and crime have not provided a definite answer to the question of whether casino 
gambling increases crime.   
Grinols and Mustard (2006) list five reasons that casino gambling may increase 
crimes:  
i) Casino activities may lead to illegal casino-related activities, for example, prostitution, 
drug usage,  
ii) Casino activities may increase crimes by increasing the potential payoffs of crime 
because visitors are considered to have more cash and be more vulnerable than 
locals, 
iii) Casino activities may increase crime through pathological gamblers, bankruptcy, 
usurious loans, and fraud,  
iv) Casino activities may increase crimes because it attracts more visitors and visitor 
criminals, and  
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v) Other industries related to casinos and its activities such as hotels and restaurants 
have a large demand for low skilled labors. This demand may change the 
composition of local residents and increase crimes3.  
Grinols and Mustard (2006) also mention that casino activities may also decrease 
crimes in two ways:  
i) Casino activities may reduce crimes directly through offering jobs and paying wages, 
and 
ii) Casino activities decrease crimes indirectly through increased tax revenue that local 
governments may have to spend on law enforcement. 
 Albanese (1985) points out that “no legitimate evidence is presented, such as 
convictions of (organized) criminals involved in (Atlantic City) casinos, to support their 
views…” (that casinos are connected with organized crime) (p. 40). Walker (2010) also 
points out that “most casinos are now corporate owned and managed, and the old 
stereotype of casinos as mob money-laundering operations has faded…” (p. 488).  
Research investigating the relationship between casino gambling and crime was 
sparse until New Jersey legalized the commercial casinos in 1978. Walker (2010) divides the 
research history into two periods; early studies period (1985 ~ 2000) and recent studies 
period (2001~ 2010). Some early studies (1985 ~ 2000) suggest that casinos cause higher 
crime rate, e.g., Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt (1989) and Hakim and Buck (1989) (See 
                                                 
3 Grinols and Mustard (2006) claim that an increase in demand for unskilled and lower-income employees may 
alter the composition of the labor force and residents toward those who are more apt to engage in criminal 
activity without the rigorous tests.   
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Table 2 for summary of early studies). This is consistent with our intuition, which suggests 
that if there is a large increase in the population and visitors in an area, there is likely to be an 
increase in the number of crime incidents.  However, some of the other early studies (1985 
~ 2000) could not find the clear linkage between crime and casinos, e.g., Albanese (1985) 
and Chang (1996). 
Albanese (1985) argues that there is no connection between casino gambling and 
crime.  Albanese (1985) points out that “crime statistics can be extremely misleading when 
they failed to account for: i) changes in population risk, ii) changes in criminal opportunities, 
iii) changes in law enforcement and priorities and iv) changes in crime elsewhere in the state,” 
(pp. 40-41).  In addition Albanese (1985) concludes that the actual risk of being victimized 
decreases if the crime rate is adjusted to the visitors.  The importance of adjusted crime rate 
was reiterated by Miller and Schwartz (1998) and Walker (2008 and 2010).  
Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt (1989) and Hakim and Buck (1989) use similar 
regression analyses with panel data from the year before and after the introduction of 
casinos of the localities near and including Atlantic City, New Jersey. They compare the 
effect of casinos in pre-casino years and post-casino years and find that the level of crimes 
appears higher in the post-casino years than the pre-casino years in Atlantic City. They also 
find that there is a spillover effect that the localities adjacent to Atlantic City have a higher 
level of crimes (Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt, 1989), and both distance and police outlays 
were associated with less crime (Hakim and Buck, 1989). 
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Table 2: Casino-Crime Studies, 1985-2010 
Study 
Name of 
Journal 
State/region 
studied 
Year 
analyzed 
Year 
casino 
opens 
Casinos 
increase 
crime rate? 
Population 
adjusted 
for visitors 
Albanese (1985) Federal Probation Atlantic City 1978-82 1978 No Yes 
Friedman et al. 
(1989) 
Journal of Regional 
Science 
Atlantic City 1974-84 1978 Yes No 
Hakim and Buck 
(1989) 
Journal of Criminal 
Justice 
Atlantic City 1972-84 1978 Yes No 
Curran and Scarpitti 
(1991) 
Deviant Behavior Atlantic City 1985-89 1978 No Yes 
Giacopassi and Stitt 
(1993) 
Journal of Criminal 
Justice 
Atlantic City 1991-93 1992 Yes No 
Chang(1996) 
Journal of Criminal 
Justice 
Biloxi, MS 1986-94 1992 No Yes 
Stokowski(1996) 
Journal of Travel 
Research 
Biloxi, MS 1989-94 1991 No Yes 
General Accounting 
Office(2000) 
US General Accounting 
Office 
Atlantic City 1977-97 1978 No Yes 
Gazel, Rickman and 
Thompson (2001) 
Managerial and 
Decision Economics 
Wisconsin 1981-94 (Tribal) Yes No 
Wilson(2001) Crime & Delinquency Indiana 1992-97 1995 No No 
Evans and Topoleski 
(2002) 
NBER Working Paper 
National 
(tribal only) 
1985-
1989 
(various) Yes No 
Stitt, Nichols and 
Giacopassi (2003) 
Crime & Delinquency Various 
1980s-
1990s 
(various) Mixed Yes 
Betsinger (2005) 
University of Maryland 
Thesis 
144 counties 
in 33 states 
1977-
2001 
(various) Mixed No 
Grinols and Mustard 
(2006) 
Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
All US 
counties 
1977-
1996 
(various) Yes No 
Barthe and Stitt 
(2007, 2009a, 2009b) 
Journal of Gambling 
Studies 
Reno, NV 2003 1937 No Yes 
Clark and Walker 
(2009) 
International Gambling 
Studies 
Various 
1994–95, 
1996 and 
2001–02 
(various) No Yes 
Reece(2010) 
Contemporary Economic 
Policy 
Indiana 
1994-
2004 
1995 No Yes 
Source: Modified from Table 19.2 and Table 19.3 in Walker (2010) 
13 
 
Giacopassi and Stitt (1993) focus on Biloxi, Mississippi. They divide crimes into 
different categories to find the effect of the introduction of casino on each category. 
Giacopassi and Stitt (1993) conclude that “there is no significant difference between the two 
periods for total violent crime.” (p. 124) and “failed to achieve statistical significance.”(p. 
126).  
Chang (1996) measures the impact of casinos on crime on the basis of data for 118 
criminal offenses collected from Biloxi, Mississippi, too. Overall, there was no increase in the 
crime rates during the first two years of casino introduction. During the first full year of 
casinos, there was a substantial decrease in crime rates, but the crime rates returned to the 
pre-casino level in the second year.  
There are flaws in these early studies. Early studies do not have enough data to 
analyze the relationship between casinos and crimes because most of casinos were opened in 
1990s (Walker, 2008).  More importantly, as Walker (2008) points out, visitors are not 
included in the calculation of the crime rate in some early studies. Walker (2008) claims that 
crime rate “must be adjusted to account for the crime committed by visitors and for the 
increase in the population at risk of being victimized by crime”. 
Stitt, Nichols and Giacopassi (2003) compare the crime rates in six new casino 
jurisdictions to six non-casino control communities. The experimental and control 
communities were matched on 15 socioeconomic variables (p. 253). The results from their 
analysis are mixed. The authors conclude that “crime does not inevitably increase with the 
introduction of a casino into a community”.   
14 
 
Betsinger (2005) analyzes the crime effects from various types of Native American 
and commercial land-based casinos, racinos, riverboat casinos, and Native American bingo 
halls. This research offers another way to check the relationship between casino and crime, 
i.e., which type of casino is more suitable for local community than the others.  Betsinger 
(2005) examines the impact of gambling revenues in general on county-level crime rates and 
the impact of separate types of gambling revenues on county-level crime. She concludes that 
“both parts of the analysis produced mixed findings,” (p.74) i.e., some types of crimes 
increases and some others types decreases, and some types of gambling revenues increase 
some types of crime and also decrease some types of crime.  
Grinols and Mustard (2006) examine county-level crime data in every US counties 
from 1977 through 1996. They conclude that “after five years, 8.6% of the observed 
property crime and 12.6% of the violent crime in casino counties are due to casinos” (p. 42), 
and “the social crime cost associated with casinos is $75 per adult in 1996” (p. 44). Grinols 
and Mustard (2006) also claim that “crime was created in casino counties, rather than simply 
being shifted from one area to another” (p. 44). They conclude that casinos increased all 
crimes except murder. 
Clark and Walker (2009) find that “there are some positive links between gambling 
and criminal activity” (p. 132). They find that the more money a person had lost in a 
particular year, the more likely the person was to commit a crime.  
Reece (2010) utilizes some control variables in his model which were missing in 
previous studies.  First, he uses the number of hotel rooms as a measure of tourism in his 
model. Second, he uses turnstile count of patrons entering the casinos as a measure of casino 
15 
 
activities. Third, he also includes law enforcement in studying the effects of casinos on crime 
which is also claimed very important by Albanese (1985). Reece concludes that “very limited 
support for the proposition that new casinos increase local crime rates.” (p.157) 
2.2. Relationship between Casino and Regional Economy 
 The second issue is the relationship between casinos and regional economy. Casinos 
and casino-related service industry will attract a large amount of visitors to the region 
because it is an entertainment industry. As an entertainment industry, casino industry does 
not demand a large amount of natural resource or highly skilled labor. Eadington (1999), 
points out that “jurisdictions that legalized casinos were often resource poor, or under 
economic duress. One or both of these factors apply to Monaco (1863), Nevada (1931), 
Macao (in the early 20th century), the Caribbean (1960s), and Atlantic City (1976), and help 
explain why many of the newly authorized American jurisdictions were keen on having 
casinos.” (p. 187). 
The success of Las Vegas casino gambling has precipitated the wave of legalizing 
casino gambling.  Tourism, especially the number of visitors, is a key indicator that reflects 
the level of economic development.  The local community benefits directly from the tax 
levied on the casino revenues and other related services revenue including hotels and 
restaurants. In addition, casino and casino related industries offer job opportunities to (low 
skilled) labor force in the local community.  Rephann et al. (1997) report that “casino gaming 
is a popular strategy for local economic development in the United States...” (Rephann et al., 
1997).  
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There are also side effects of casino gambling on the local economy. Gazel (1998) 
argues that “… should also examine the negative side associated with casino gambling and 
not focus only on the positive side of job creation and increased tax revenues.” (Gazel, 1998, 
p.83). Eadington (1998) argues that   “… the bulk of gambling revenues are generated by 
local residents… then spending on gambling reflects a reallocation of spending within the 
local or regional economy,” (Eadington, 1998, p. 63). Even so, generally, rural counties that 
have adopted casino experience have higher household income and employment level 
(Garrett, 2004). 
As discussed in many previous studies, the number of visitors is an important 
indicator of the level of local economy and its development.  It leads us the question how 
crimes and visitors interact. Our intuition tells that there exists negative relationship, i.e., 
more crimes will lead to less visitors. Also, it is possible that the more visitors might induce 
more crimes (visitor criminals), and thus higher crime rates in the region. One interesting 
thing is that, whether there are differences between casino tourism and non-casino tourism 
or not.  
Ochrym (1990) concludes that (in Atlantic City area) tourism (visitor) is not 
significantly different from non-casino tourism, and that the increased crime in Atlantic City 
is due to casinos, not tourism.  Grinols and Mustard (2011) concludes that “national park 
visitors have no crime inducing effects, and therefore, that different visitor types have 
different crime effects.” We agree with this conclusion that casino visitors are different with 
national park visitors because the act of gambling always involves money, win and lose. For 
17 
 
some people, it is only an entertainment, but for someone else it is a chance they would like 
to risk their money as if to invest it.     
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY: SIMUTANEOUS EQUATION SYSTEM 
 
3.1. Endogeneity 
 Casino gambling may decrease crimes or increase crimes (Grinols and Mustard, 
2006), and both casino gambling and crimes interact with visitors as discussed in Chapter 2.  
This might be the reason that the previous studies do not have consistent results, i.e., casino 
gambling causes the more crimes.  As shown in Table 3, researchers have not considered the 
possibility of endogeneity (jointly determined) issue, that is, crimes could also affect casino 
activities. All previous studies consider crime rates (or number of crime incidences) as the 
dependent variable and casino activities as the independent variable.      
 It is also noteworthy that most of previous studies use the dummy variable to 
indicate opening casinos in the region.  There would be two reasons.  First, most of studies 
attempt to compare the changes in crime before and after the introduction of casino.  
Second, there is no adequate measure to represent casino activities.  Reece (2010) uses the 
number of hotel room and casino volumes for the casino activities.  
 We assume that more casinos activities would increase the crime rate, then with a 
higher crime rate, we expect that the number of visitors would decrease (perhaps population, 
too) because the visitors (and locals) try to avoid crimes.  And, in turn, decreases in visitors 
would have a negative effect on casinos revenue.  A lowered casinos revenue and casino 
activities reduces the crime because the region would have less visitors and visitor criminals.  
Less crime would increase the number of visitors and, in turn, casino’s revenue. 
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Table 3: Methodologies and Key Variables used in Previous Studies 
Study 
Region 
studied 
Methodology 
Dependent 
Variables 
Key Independent 
Variables 
Albanese (1985) Atlantic City Comparison 
Number of crime incidents before and after the 
introduction of casinos 
Friedman et al. 
(1989) 
Atlantic City Regression Crime rate 
Casino dummy 
Population size and density 
Unemployment rate 
Hakim and Buck 
(1989) 
Atlantic City Regression Crime rate 
Casino dummy 
Unemployment rate 
Property value 
Number of police 
Curran and 
Scarpitti (1991) 
Atlantic City Comparison Crime rate before and after the introduction of casinos 
Giacopassi and 
Stitt (1993) 
Atlantic City Comparison 
Number of crime incidents before and after the 
introduction of casinos 
Chang(1996) Biloxi, MS Regression Number of crimes Casino dummy 
Stokowski(1996) Biloxi, MS Comparison Crime rate before and after the introduction of casinos 
Gazel et al. 
(2001) 
Wisconsin Regression Crime rate 
Casino dummy 
County fixed effect 
Time fixed effect 
Wilson(2001) Indiana Comparison 
Crime incidents  before and after the introduction of 
casinos 
Evans and 
Topoleski (2002) 
National 
(tribal only) 
Regression 
Outcome of tribes 
(population, employment, 
unemployment rate, ratio 
of employment to adults, 
working but poor) 
Casino dummy, 
County demographics 
Stitt et al. (2003) Various Comparison 
Crime rate and population at risk before and after the 
introduction of casino 
Betsinger (2005) 
144 counties 
in 33 states 
Regression Crime rate 
Casino opening variable 
Casino type variable 
Numbers of slots, table games, etc. 
Grinols and 
Mustard (2006) 
All US 
counties 
Regression Crime rate 
Casino dummy 
National crime rate trends 
Population density, demographics (22 
variables) 
Barthe and Stitt 
(2007, 2009a, 
2009b) 
Reno, NV Comparison 
Compare the crime rate (2007), calls to police (2009a) 
and timing of calls for police (2009b) in casino and 
non-casino areas 
Clark and 
Walker (2009) 
Various Regression 
Probability of 
committing serious 
crime 
Gambling variables(individuals’ 
current gambling practices) 
Population demographics(income, 
unemployment rate, poverty rate)  
Reece(2010) Indiana Regression Crime rate 
Hotel rooms 
Turnstile count, 
County fixed effects 
Time fixed Effects 
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In short, there is a loop of causality.  Figure 4 illustrates the loop of the cause-and-
effect relationship among crimes, visitors and casino activity. Greek letters in Figure 4 are 
coefficients in the structural model introduced later in this section. The symbol + indicates 
the positive effect and  indicates the negative impact. In other words, casinos, crime, and 
visitors should be considered simultaneously in a system of equations. The next section 
introduces the structural model. 
 
 
Figure 4: A Causality Loop 
Note: The symbol + indicates a positive effect, and the symbol – indicates a negative effect between 
variables.  The arrow shows the causal flow. 
 
 
3.2. Simultaneous Model 
 To deal with endogeneity among variables, the system of equations describing casino 
activities, visitor and crime (or crime rate) is constructed.  The casino revenue, which is the 
proxy of casino activities4 in this research, is the function of the number of visitors that 
represents the casino gambling demand.  Macro or regional economic condition may also 
                                                 
4 The casino revenue may not be the appropriate proxy variable to represent casino activities in Las Vegas 
region. Casino activities include casino gambling and related businesses such as restaurants, leisure, convention, 
tour and travel, and other entertainments. Recent trend shows that the revenue from casino gambling is 
roughly 50% of the total regional tax revenue (personal communication with Professor Nichols, Department of 
Economics, University of Nevada, Reno)     
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affect the casino revenue. The Dow Jones Index is used as a composite proxy for these 
conditions. The Dow Jones Index describes the late-2000s financial crisis (credit crunch) 
well. The casino revenue equation is given by: 
(1) 
t
i
i
iittt monthTdowvstrrvn 1
11
1
3210 lnlnln   


, 
where t is the subscript for time (month), rvn is the casino revenue, vstr is the number of 
visitors, dow is the Dow Jones Index, T is a trend variable. The trend variable captures the 
effects that hard to observe but affect the casino revenue and is correlated with time.  Lastly, 
the variable month is monthly dummy which captures seasonality in the casino revenue data 
as described in data section.  The number of visitors is expected to have a positive impact on 
the casino revenue.  The sign of dow is also expected to be positive. The casino revenue 
equation has one endogenous variable (vstr) and thirteen exogenous variables (dow, T, 
monthi).   
A visitor equation is a function of the casino revenue as the proxy of casinos 
activities, the crime rate, and the proxy for general economic condition. The visitor equation 
is: 
(2) 
t
i
i
iitttt monthTdowcrmrvnvstr 2
11
1
43210 lnlnlnln   


, 
where crm is the crime rate. The expected sign of the casino revenue is positive (more casino 
activities attract more visitors), and the expected sign of crime is negative (visitors tend to 
avoid high crime area).  The expected sign of dow is expected to be positive.  The visitor 
equation contains two endogenous variables (rvn, crm) and thirteen exogenous variables 
(dow, T, monthi).   
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A crime equation includes the casino revenue, and the Dow Jones Index.  We drop 
the number of visitor from the crime equation because the crime rate includes the visitor 
information in it.   The crime equation includes the crime clearance rate that measures the 
deterrence or effectiveness of law enforcement5.  The crime equation is given by: 
(3) 
t
i
i
iitttt monthTdowclearrvncrm 3
11
1
43210 lnlnlnln   


, 
where clear is the crime clearance rate. The crime equation contains one endogenous 
variable (rvn), and fourteen exogenous variables (clear, dow, T, monthi).   
3.3. Income Equation 
In addition, the regional income equation is considered to portray the connection 
between the regional income, measured by the per capita income, and the casino revenue in 
the region6.  The direct lag model is the straightforward way of computing an effect and 
duration interval7 of the casino revenue on the regional income.  Assume that the regional 
income at time t is a linear function of the present and past casino revenue only; the income 
equation is given by: 
(4) 
t
j
jjT
n
i
itit quarterTrvninc 4
3
10
0 lnln   


, 
where inc is per capita income in the region, and rvnti is the casino revenue in time t  i. 
                                                 
5  According to Becker (1968), criminals are rational and will react to incentives, that is, the expected 
punishment for commuting crimes. Levitt (1996 and 1997) shows that deterrence has negative impact on crime. 
6 Note that the income equation is not included in the system of equations because of the data interval. The per 
capita income data is available on quarterly basis not monthly basis. 
7 The regional income would respond to the casino revenue (in Las Vegas) spontaneously while there would be 
a time lagged effect because i) it takes time for businesses and local residents to adjust to changes in the casino 
revenue, and ii) changing taxes and local government spending due to changes in the casino revenue has a 
significant lag time to take an effect.  
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 Since the number of regressors could be infinite, estimation of equation (4) is not 
feasible.  Even if the lag were arbitrarily truncated, it might still be difficult to obtain precise 
estimates because the casino revenue is likely to be highly autocorrelated (actually it is), 
implying potentially severe multicollinearity (Clarke, 1976).  The most popular model is the 
Koyck (1954) distributed lag model.  It is usually derived from the direct lag equation (4) in 
which n is assumed to be infinite and the decay is exponentially declining, i.e., there is a real 
number  such that 0    1 and i = i1 for i = 1, 2, … Then equation (4) reduces to  
(5) 
t
j
jjTttrt vquarterTincrvninc  


3
1
10 lnln)1(ln  , 
where 14  tttv  .  The transformation of equation (4) into equation (5) is called the 
Koyck transformation. This transformation reduces the number of parameters to estimate 
and the multicolliniearity problem (Griffths, Hill, and Judge, 1993, p. 690). 
 It is noteworthy that equation (5) gives important implication such that estimates of 
the instantaneous effect of the casino revenue, the parameter r (Leach and Reekie, 1996), 
and immediate carryover effect of the casino revenue, the parameter , obtained directly.  
Therefore 1   represents the rate of the casino revenue decay (Berndt, 1991).  The 
cumulative effect of the casino revenue on the regional income after m periods, i.e., the 
instantaneous plus the carryover effect, equals )1/()1()1( 12    mr
m
r  . 
As m approaches infinity, the total cumulative impact of the casino revenue on the regional 
income converges to  
(6) 
)1(
EffectCumulative



 r . 
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3.4. Estimation and Elasticities 
 There are several methods for estimating simultaneous equations. The two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS) is efficient and consistent but it ignores information concerning the 
endogenous variables which appear in the system but not in individual equations (Judge et al. 
1988). A seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) accounts for the correlation in the error 
terms across equations but does not consider the endogenous problem in each question.  
Three-stage least squares (3SLS) is considered a combination of 2SLS and SUR. It accounts 
for the contemporaneous correlation in the error terms across equations and the correlation 
of the right hand side variables with the error term.  Furthermore, it is asymptotically more 
efficient than 2SLS (Judge et al. 1988).  Thus, we adopt 3SLS to estimate the system of 
equations. 
Elasticities are then calculated using the chain-rule from the system of equations 
such that:  
The elasticities with respect to crm: 
21
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In this manner we can derive elasticities of endogenous variables with respect to 
endogeneous variables in the system.   
The disturbance in the income equation in equation (5) follows a first order moving 
average process, i.e., 14  tttv  , and is correlated with the 1tinc  regressor, and 
therefore the least square estimation is biased and inconsistent.  To obtain the consistent 
results, the autocorrelation should be fixed.   
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY REGION AND DATA 
 
 Las Vegas, Nevada is selected as the study region to build the simultaneous equation 
system in equations (1), (2), and (3).  Las Vegas is selected because Las Vegas has the longest 
history of casino industry (legalized in 1931) as well as the casino business has been one of 
the most important industries in the region.   
 Somewhat interestingly, there is no study investigating the relationship between 
casino and crime in Las Vegas (See Table 2). In the previous studies, researchers have 
focused on how the introduction of casinos would affect the crime (or crime rate), i.e., 
changes in crime (or crime rate) before and after casino introduction.  However, in Las 
Vegas, it is impossible to collect crime data before it was legalized in 1931 since no data was 
collected.  
4.1.   Data Collection and Key Variables 
 The data set for the empirical analysis is comprised of monthly data spanning from 
January 1996 to July 2011 (187 observations).  
4.1.1. Crime Rate 
 The crime data are compiled from Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) in Nevada 
Department of Public Safety8 . Two types of crime rates, a reported crime rate and an 
adjusted crime rate, are calculated based on the population and population adjusted for the 
                                                 
8 Available at http://nvrepository.state.nv.us/crimejustice.shtml; UCR data include homicide, forcible rape, 
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 
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visitors as suggested in Albanese (1985) and Walker (2008).  Figure 5 shows the reported 
crime rates and the adjusted crime rates9 in Las Vegas from January 1996-July 2011.  The 
reported crime rate is decreasing over time but the adjusted crime rate is fairly constant 
(slightly decreasing)10.   
 
 
Figure 5: Plots of Crime Rate (per 1000 persons) 
Source: Crime incidences are collected from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) in Nevada Department of 
Public Safety.  Crime rates are calculated by author. 
 
 
4.1.2. Casino Revenue  
 Researchers have used different measures of casino activities, for example, Grinols 
and Mustard (2006) use the dummy variable, e.g., one indicates the casino opening, zero 
otherwise. Reece (2010) uses the number of hotel rooms and Betsinger (2005) uses the 
                                                 
7 Reported crime rate = (CR + CV)/PR, Adjusted crime rate = (CR + CV)/(PR + PV), where CR = crimes 
committed by residents, CV = crime committed by visitors, PR = resident’s population, PV = visitors’ 
population.  By construction the reported crime rate is always higher than adjusted crime rate.   
8 A possible explanation for this is because of the decrease of crime incidents and the growth rate of local 
population is higher than that of visitors. 
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number of slot machines as an index of casino activities. We use the win amount (money the 
casino takes) or casino revenue as the index of the casino activities. Casino revenue data are 
obtained from Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board11 and deflated 
using GDP deflators (Figure 6).  From Figure 6, we find that casino revenue has a strong 
seasonality and starts decreasing at the end of 2007 and it stays decreasing trend. It is likely 
that the decreases in casino revenue stem from the financial economic crisis in late 2000s.  
As shown in Figure 6, there exists a strong seasonality. 
 
 
Figure 6: Plots of Gaming Revenue, Deflated (million dollars) 
Source: Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board 
4.1.3. Visitors 
 The visitor data are obtained from the statistical reports in Las Vegas Convention 
and Visitor Authority12.  Figure 7 shows the number of visitors of Las Vegas from January 
1996 - July 2011.  As shown in Figure 7, there exists a strong seasonality.   
                                                 
11 Available at http://gaming.nv.gov/ 
12 Available at http://www.lvcva.com/ 
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Figure 7: Plots of Visitors (million persons) 
Source: Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority 
 
4.1.4. Other Variables and Basic Statistics 
 We use the Dow Jones Index as an index of US economic condition to describe the 
2008-2009 financial downturns. When Dow Jones Index is high, the US economy is likely to 
be performing well and thus it may stimulate visitors to visit Las Vegas area more frequently.  
Dow Jones Index is obtained from EconStats (www.econstats.com). Basic statistical 
elements are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Basic Statistics (January 1996 ~ July 2011)a 
 
Casino 
Revenueb 
Reported  
Crime Rate 
Adjusted 
Crime Rate 
Visitors 
Dow Jones 
Index 
Unit ($ million) (per 1000 
persons) 
(per 1000 persons) (million persons)  
Average 709.80 4.15 1.42 2.96 9897.90 
Std.Dev 
Dev. 
91.34 0.70 0.20 0.30 1897.00 
CV (%) 12.87 16.90 13.73 10.15 19.17 
Min 528.96 2.50 1.01 2.25 5117.12 
Median 700.48 4.17 1.45 3.01 10273.60 
Max 967.81 5.91 1.85 3.53 13924.20 
Count 187.00 187 187 187 187 
Note: a Monthly Data; b Deflated using GDP deflator 
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4.2. Results and Discussion 
4.2.1. Casino Revenue, Visitors, and Adjusted Crime Equations 
Regression results of the system with the adjusted crime rate are presented in Table 5 
and most of the coefficients have the expected signs13.  Table 5 also contains the results for 
the single equation model using the least squares for the comparison. From Table 5 we 
observe followings.   
 Casino revenue equation (Equation 1): 
 The coefficient of visitors is positive and statistically significant, i.e., the more visitors, 
the more casino revenues, which is obvious. The coefficient of Dow is positive and 
statistically significant; it implies that the casino revenue is higher when the US economy is 
better.  Trend variable is also statistically significant but has the negative sign.  The single 
equation model results are similar but different magnitudes, for example, the economic 
situation (Dow variable) has much stronger impact on the casino revenue.  Note that the 
serial correlation is detected in all three equations with the Breusch-Godfrey test14.  It is fixed 
using Prais–Winsten process15. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The system of equations with the reported crime rate are also estimated and presented in Appendix A to 
compare the differences between the adjusted crime rate and the reported crime rate and to test robustness of 
the estimation.  
14 The Breusch-Godfrey test is a Lagrange multiplier test of H0: no autocorrelation versus H1: errors = AR(p).  
The test is carried out by regressing the OLS residuals on regressors and referring TR2 to the tabled critical 
value for the chi-squared distribution with p degrees of freedom (Greene, 2000, p.541). 
15 Prais-Winsten estimation is a procedure to take care of the serial correlation in a linear model. It is a 
modification of Cochrane-Orcutt estimation in the sense that it does not lose the first observation 
(Wooldridge, 2009, p. 422). 
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Table 5: 3SLS Estimation Results with Adjusted Crime Ratea 
Equation Variable 
3SLS OLSb 
Coefficient Coefficient 
ln(Casino Revenue) 
ln(Visitors) 
 1.4295*** 
(0.115)*** 
 0.6831*** 
(0.153) *** 
ln(Dow Jones Index) 
 0.0911*** 
(0.040)*** 
 0.2428*** 
(0.057) *** 
Trend 
0.0011*** 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0005*** 
(0.000) *** 
Constant 
 5.0309*** 
(0.080)*** 
 5.3640*** 
(0.123) *** 
R squared 0.7055*** 0.8687*** 
ln(Visitors) 
ln(Casino Revenue) 
 0.8243*** 
(0.083)*** 
 0.0504*** 
(0.031)*** 
ln(Adjusted Crime Rate) 
-0.1560*** 
(0.042)*** 
-0.2291*** 
(0.038)*** 
ln(Dow) 
-0.1500*** 
(0.047)*** 
 0.0115*** 
(0.044)*** 
Trend 
 0.0007*** 
(0.000) *** 
 0.0011*** 
(0.000)*** 
Constant 
4.0659*** 
(0.437)*** 
 0.6272*** 
(0.208)*** 
R squared 0.7920*** 0.8355*** 
ln(Adjusted Crime Rate) 
ln(Casino Revenue) 
 0.2931*** 
(0.139)*** 
 0.0859*** 
(0.061)*** 
ln(Clearance Rate) 
0.2895*** 
(0.039)*** 
0.1581*** 
(0.045)*** 
ln(Dow Jones Index) 
-0.4099*** 
(0.065)*** 
-0.1881*** 
(0.085) *** 
Trend 
-0.0005*** 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0009*** 
(0.001)*** 
Constant 
 0.3846*** 
(0.879)*** 
 0.8624*** 
(0.454)*** 
R squared 0.6388*** 0.4346*** 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% 
(*).  
a Monthly dummies are omitted to save space. Appendix A provides the complete estimation results 
b Serial correlation is detected in all three equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–
Winsten regression is used to fix the serial correlation.  
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Visitor equation (Equation 2): 
We find that the coefficient of the casino revenue is positive and statistically 
significant, i.e., the more casino activities attract more visitors. The sign of the adjusted crime 
rate is, as expected, negative and statistically significant; the higher crime rate crowds out 
visitors from the region.  The Dow has a negative sign and statistically significant, which is 
interesting; maybe it is because people tend to purchase other types of entertainments rather 
than the casino gambling when the economy is good. A bad economic situation may increase 
the number of visitors to the Las Vegas who want to take their chances on the casino 
gambling. The single equation results show the similar pattern but both the casino revenue 
and the Dow are not statistically significant which is not consistent with our intuition.  The 
adjusted crime rate has much stronger impact on the number of visitors in the single 
equation model. 
Adjusted crime equation (Equation 3): 
The coefficient of the casino revenue is positive and statistically significant, which 
implies that the casino activities indeed increase the adjusted crime rate. Note that the 
coefficient of the casino revenue in the single equation model is not statistically significant 
and it is consistent with findings in other studies such as Walker (2008) (See Table 2 
Summary of previous literature).  As expected, the coefficients of the crime clearance rate 
have negative sign and statistically significant. It indicates that the effectiveness of the law 
enforcement has a negative effect on the adjusted crime rate.  The Dow is negative and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with our intuition.  
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Elasticities 
Elasticities of endogenous variables, i.e., casino revenue, visitors, and the adjusted 
crime rates, with respect to endogenous variables are derived using the chain rule as 
discussed in the previous section (Table 6). When the adjusted crime rate increases, it leads 
to the decrease in the number of visitors and the casino revenues.  The casino revenue 
elasticity is estimated to be 0.22 and the 95% confidence band is given by 0.32 ~ 0.12.  
It implies that the casino revenue decreases by 0.12% ~ 0.32% when the adjusted crime rate 
increases by 1%. When the casino revenue increases by 1%, it leads to an increase in the 
adjusted crime rate by 0.29%.  Note that the 95% confidence band of the adjusted crime rate 
elasticity is quite large, which is 0.02 ~ 0.57, but not zero.   
 
 
Table 6: Estimated Elasticities with 95% Confidence Bands 
 Elasticities 
                   Of 
w.r.t 
Revenue Visitors Adjusted Crime Rate 
Adjusted Crime Rate 
0.2230 
[-0.3230, -0.1230] 
0.1560 
[-0.2390, -0.0730] 
 
Visitors 
 1.4295 
[1.2050, 1.6539] 
 
0.4190  
[0.0131, 0.8250] 
Casino Revenue  
 0.8243 
[0.6616, 0.9870] 
0.2931 
[0.0200, 0.5663] 
Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence bands.  Confidence bands are constructed based on the 
estimated variance-covariance of the estimated parameters in Table 5 (nlcom – nonlinear 
combination of estimators in STATA software).  
Note: The numbers are elasticities. For example,-0.2230 means if the adjusted crime rate increase by 
1%, the casino revenue will decrease by 0.2230%. 
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4.2.2. Income Equation 
 The economy of Las Vegas is largely dependent upon the performance of casino and 
casino-related industries.  As a key index of the performance of an economy, we assume that 
there exists a close relationship between personal income and the casino revenue as shown 
in equation (5), the Koyck model.   
The data of personal income are compiled from the BEA but the quarterly personal 
income data for Las Vegas region are unavailable. The quarterly data of per capita income of 
Las Vegas are generated from the annual data of Las Vegas and quarterly Nevada personal 
income data (See Appendix B for data interpolation). The basic statistics are reported in 
Table 7.  Per capita income in Las Vegas region is $8,400 (2005 dollar) during spring 1996 – 
winter 2011. Average quarterly income in 2011 is $8,920 (2005 dollar).16 
 
 
Table 7: Basic Statistics (Spring 1996 ~ Winter 2011)a  
 
Per Capita Incomeb 
($/person) 
Casino Revenueb 
($ million) 
Average 8,399.65 2122.46 
Std. Dev. 531.20 248.15 
CV (%) 6.32 11.69 
Min 7,436.22 1697.48 
Median 8,294.33 2083.08 
Max 9,367.76 2703.00 
a Quarterly data; number of observation = 64 
b Deflated using GDP deflator (2005 = 100) 
 
 
                                                 
16 For comparison, 2011 quarterly personal income for Nevada is $8,152 (2005 dollar) and 2011 quarterly 
personal income for the U.S. is $9,166 (2005 dollar). 
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The regression results of income equation are shown in Table 8.  As expected, the 
income equation suffers from the serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic = 
14.87 and the null hypothesis is rejected) and fixed with the Prais-Wintern regression.  As 
shown in Table 8, the short-run effect of the casino revenue is 0.11.  It means that one 
percent increase in the casino revenue will result in an immediate increase in the personal 
income of 0.11%, which is small.  The cumulative effect, by the way, is calculated using 
equation (6) which is given by 0.52 = 0.1071/(1 – 0.7930).  It implies that a current increase 
in the casino revenue by 1% leads to a 0.52% increase in the personal income cumulatively. 
 
 
Table 8: Income Equation (Koyck Model)a  
Equation Variable Coefficient Std. Err 
 
 
 
 
ln(Personal Income) 
ln(Casino Revenue)  0.1071*** (0.035) 
ln(Personal Income t-1)  0.7930*** (0.063) 
ln(Dow Jones Index)  0.0056 (0.008) 
Trend -0.0005*** (0.008) 
Spring -0.0305*** (0.003) 
Summer  0.0010 (0.003) 
Fall -0.0025 (0.003) 
Constant -0.4581 (0.492) 
Rho 0.5184 
R squared 0.9995 
 No. of Obs. 63 
Note: Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level; Serial correlation is detected in all three 
equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–Winsten regression is used to fix it.  
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) = 1.032; Durbin-Watson statistics (transformed) = 2.018 
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Using the elasticities in Table 6 and results in Table 8, we estimate the impact of the 
adjusted crime on the personal income in Las Vegas.  The 1% increase in the adjusted crime 
rate leads to 0.22%0.10% decreases in the casino revenue and thus, 0.02%0.01% 
decreases in the personal income instantaneously.17  It is equivalent to a loss of $7$3 per 
person or $19$8 per household18 in 2011.  Cumulatively, the 1% increase in the adjusted 
crime rate leads to 0.11%0.05% decrease in the personal income.19  It is equivalent to a loss 
of $39$17 per person or $10544 per household. 
                                                 
17 Elasticity of the casino revenue with respect to crime is 0.22 (Table 6) and instantaneous elasticity of the 
personal income with respect to the casino revenue is 0.11 (Table 8). Thus 1% increase in the adjusted crime 
rate decreases the personal income by 0.02% = 0. 22%  0.1071 
18 Assuming the household size is 2.72 persons (US Census Bureau quick facts) 
19 0.11% = 0. 22%  0.517 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Before concluding the study, one caveat should be addressed.  The casino revenue 
may not be the appropriate proxy variable for the casino activities. Casino gambling, as a 
part of the entertainment industries in Las Vegas, only accounts for the part of local tax 
revenues. There are many other industries affiliated to casino industry such as hotels, 
restaurants, other tour and travel segments. There might be more appropriate proxy 
variables for casino activities, for example, hotel room occupancy.  
A system of three equations representing the casino revenue, visitors and crime is 
estimated using 3SLS (Table 5). Results show that the adjusted crime has the negative impact 
on the casino revenue and the regional economy. One percent increase in the adjusted crime 
rate (in Las Vegas) would reduce the casino revenue by 0.22%  0.10% and in turn, cause 
0.02%  0.01% instantaneous decrease in personal income (or equivalently $19  $8 loss per 
household) and 0.11%0.05% decrease in the personal income (or equivalently $10544 loss 
per household) cumulatively. 
In considering the endogeneity, the effect of the casino activities on the adjusted 
crime rate is positive and statistically significant, which is a different finding from the 
previous studies. The elasticity of the crime with respect to the casino activities is estimated 
as 0.29 0.27 in Las Vegas.  One percent expansion of casino activities in Lag Vegas causes 
1917 more crime incidences per month. 
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Policy implications based on findings in this research are following: 
 Efforts to reduce crime can be effective tool to boost the regional economy (in Las 
Vegas).  For example, one percent higher crime clearance rate increases the casino 
revenue by 0.065%  0.024%20.   
 Cutting the link between casino gambling and crime is important: increases in casino 
activities attract the more visitors and boost the regional economy.  However, the 
expansion of casino activities also increases the crime and thus the effect of 
expansion is alleviated. To cut the link, pay more attention on education or 
regulation to reduce pathological gamblers, usurious loans and the fraud related to 
casino gambling, and   
 Cutting the link between visitors and crime is crucial: the number of visitors has the 
negative relationship with crime which implies visitors avoid high crime region.  
Thus, it is essential for policy makers to enhance the image of casino gambling and 
some sorts of advertising campaign to alleviate the link between visitors and crime, 
for example, emphasizing safe and comfortable casino gambling environment. 
  
                                                 
10 Using chain-rule, we have the elasticity of revenue with respect to clearance rate as follows: 
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From Table 5, we have α1β2δ2= 0.0645, the confidence interval of which is [0.0404,0.0887]
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APPENDIX A  
Table 9: 3SLS Regression Results with Adjusted Crime Rate 
Equations Variable 
3SLS OLS a 
Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err 
ln(Casino Revenue) 
 
ln(Visitors)  1.4295*** (0.115)  0.6831*** (0.153) 
ln(Dow Jones Index)  0.0911** (0.040)  0.2428*** (0.057) 
Trend -0.0011*** (0.000) -0.0005** (0.000) 
Constant  5.0309*** (0.080)  5.3640*** (0.123) 
Jan  0.0114 (0.025)  0.0518** (0.022) 
Feb -0.0413* (0.024) -0.0182 (0.024) 
Mar -0.1655*** (0.031) -0.0450 (0.035) 
Apr -0.2037*** (0.028) -0.1114*** (0.032) 
May -0.1487*** (0.028) -0.0520 (0.033) 
Jun -0.1884*** (0.026) -0.1256*** (0.029) 
Jul -0.2017*** (0.028) -0.1058*** (0.033) 
Aug -0.1968*** (0.029) -0.0987*** (0.034) 
Sep -0.0891*** (0.026) -0.0378 (0.028) 
Oct -0.1604*** (0.029) -0.0587* (0.032) 
Nov -0.0863*** (0.025) -0.0490** (0.022) 
R squared 0.7055 0.8687 
ln(Visitors) 
ln(Casino Revenue)  0.8243*** (0.083)  0.0504 (0.031) 
ln(Adjusted crime rate) -0.1560*** (0.042) -0.2291*** (0.038) 
ln(Dow Jones Index) -0.1500*** (0.047)  0.0115 (0.044) 
Trend  0.0007*** (0.000)  0.0011*** (0.000) 
Constant -4.0659*** (0.437)  0.6272*** (0.208) 
Jan -0.0219 (0.019)  0.0461*** (0.008) 
Feb  0.0073 (0.019) -0.0008 (0.011) 
Mar  0.0873*** (0.020)  0.1269*** (0.013) 
Apr  0.1250*** (0.018)  0.0948*** (0.013) 
May  0.0835*** (0.019)  0.1072*** (0.014) 
Jun  0.1239*** (0.018)  0.0663*** (0.014) 
Jul  0.1255*** (0.018)  0.1042*** (0.014) 
Aug  0.1204*** (0.019)  0.1129*** (0.013) 
Sep  0.0477** (0.018)  0.0504*** (0.012) 
Oct  0.0946*** (0.019)  0.1134*** (0.011) 
Nov  0.0507*** (0.018)  0.0325*** (0.008) 
R squared 0.7920 0.8355 
ln(Adjusted crime rate) 
ln(Casino Revenue)  0.2931** (0.139)  0.0859 (0.061) 
ln(Clearance Rate) -0.2895*** (0.039) -0.1581*** (0.045) 
ln(Dow Jones Index) -0.4099*** (0.065) -0.1881** (0.085) 
Trend -0.0005*** (0.000) -0.0009* (0.001) 
Constant  0.3846 (0.879)  0.8624* (0.454) 
Jan -0.0399 (0.033) -0.0225 (0.016) 
Feb -0.1280*** (0.030) -0.1288*** (0.020) 
Mar -0.1504*** (0.032) -0.1317*** (0.023) 
Apr -0.1253*** (0.031) -0.1277*** (0.024) 
May -0.1219*** (0.031) -0.1091*** (0.026) 
Jun -0.0959*** (0.032) -0.1032*** (0.026) 
Jul -0.1235*** (0.031) -0.1167*** (0.026) 
Aug -0.1280*** (0.031) -0.1249*** (0.025) 
Sep -0.1096*** (0.031) -0.0985*** (0.023) 
Oct -0.1077*** (0.031) -0.0930*** (0.020) 
Nov -0.0761** (0.031) -0.0748*** (0.015) 
R squared 0.6388 0.4346 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).  
a Serial correlation is detected in all three equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–Winsten regression is used 
to fix the serial correlation.  
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Table 10: 3SLS Regression Results with Reported Crime Rate 
 3SLS OLS a 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err 
ln(Casino Revenue) 
 
ln(Visitors)  1.3893*** (0.102)  0.6831*** (0.153) 
ln(Dow Jones Index)  0.1000*** (0.038)  0.2428*** (0.057) 
Trend -0.0011*** (0.000) -0.0005** (0.000) 
Constant  5.0473*** (0.077)  5.3640*** (0.123) 
Jan  0.0136 (0.025)  0.0518** (0.022) 
Feb -0.0400 (0.024) -0.0182 (0.024) 
Mar -0.1589*** (0.029) -0.0450 (0.035) 
Apr -0.1987*** (0.027) -0.1114*** (0.032) 
May -0.1435*** (0.028) -0.0520 (0.033) 
Jun -0.1850*** (0.026) -0.1256*** (0.029) 
Jul -0.1965*** (0.027) -0.1058*** (0.033) 
Aug -0.1912*** (0.028) -0.0987*** (0.034) 
Sep -0.0862*** (0.026) -0.0378 (0.028) 
Oct -0.1549*** (0.028) -0.0587* (0.032) 
Nov -0.0843*** (0.025) -0.0490** (0.022) 
R squared 0.7077 0.8687 
ln(Visitors) 
ln(Casino Revenue)  0.7930*** (0.092)  0.0901** (0.036) 
ln(Reported Crime Rate) -0.0922* (0.051) -0.0062 (0.039) 
ln(Dow Jones Index) -0.1167** (0.051)  0.1359*** (0.034) 
Trend  0.0006*** (0.000)  0.0009*** (0.000) 
Constant -3.8619*** (0.444)  0.0104 (0.209) 
Jan -0.0145 (0.020)  0.0462*** (0.009) 
Feb  0.0180 (0.020)  0.0295** (0.012) 
Mar  0.1075*** (0.020)  0.1545*** (0.013) 
Apr  0.1402*** (0.019)  0.1254*** (0.013) 
May  0.0992*** (0.019)  0.1265*** (0.013) 
Jun  0.1338*** (0.019)  0.0902*** (0.014) 
Jul  0.1401*** (0.019)  0.1296*** (0.013) 
Aug  0.1357*** (0.019)  0.1387*** (0.013) 
Sep  0.0576*** (0.019)  0.0702*** (0.013) 
Oct  0.1092*** (0.020)  0.1336*** (0.011) 
Nov  0.0578*** (0.019)  0.0511*** (0.009) 
R squared 0.7805 0.8156 
ln(Reported Crime 
Rate) 
ln(Casino Revenue)  0.3458** (0.137)  0.0944* (0.054) 
ln(Clearance Rate) -0.3286*** (0.040) -0.1459*** (0.040) 
ln(Dow Jones Index) -0.3737*** (0.062) -0.1712** (0.079) 
Trend -0.0020*** (0.000) -0.0022*** (0.001) 
Constant  1.2178 (0.875)  1.8587*** (0.406) 
Jan -0.0068 (0.031)  0.0123 (0.014) 
Feb -0.1053*** (0.028) -0.1096*** (0.017) 
Mar -0.0476 (0.030) -0.0283 (0.020) 
Apr -0.0418 (0.028) -0.0474** (0.022) 
May -0.0376 (0.029) -0.0225 (0.023) 
Jun -0.0362 (0.030) -0.0456* (0.023) 
Jul -0.0390 (0.028) -0.0319 (0.023) 
Aug -0.0403 (0.029) -0.0328 (0.022) 
Sep -0.0682** (0.029) -0.0525** (0.020) 
Oct -0.0239 (0.029) -0.0061 (0.018) 
Nov -0.0447 (0.029) -0.0435*** (0.013) 
R squared 0.7911 0.7100 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).  
a Serial correlation is detected in all three equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–Winsten regression is used 
to fix the serial correlation.   
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APPENDIX B 
 Interpolating21 Personal Income Data 
There are only 16 observations (1996 – 2011) for the personal income in Las Vegas 
area (Clark County) because the County level income data are only available on yearly basis.  
Annual per capita personal income data for Las Vegas can be interpolated using the quarterly 
Nevada personal income data that are collected from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.gov/) assuming the income data of Las Vegas and Nevada follow the 
identical distribution.  
Let NV quarteryearPI ,  is the Nevada personal income in quarter in year, for example 
NV
qPI 1,2000  is the income in the first quarter in year 2000.  Also let 
LV
quarteryearPI ,  is the Las Vegas 
personal income in the quarter in year.  Interpolation is given by 




Winter
Springquarter
NV
quarteryear
NV
quarteryear
LV
yearLV
quarteryear
PI
PIPI
PI
,
,
, ,  
where LVyearPI  is the annual Las Vegas personal income data available from 1996-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Interpolation is a method of constructing new data points within the range of a discrete set of known data 
points.   
